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The War Against Forgetfulness: Sociological Lessons from Bauman’s Writings on European 
Jewry 
Matt Dawson, University of Glasgow 
Abstract: This paper argues against assigning Zygmunt Bauman to the category of a 
‘white’, ‘European’ theorist and the tendency to speak of an undifferentiated 
‘Eurocentrism’.  To argue this, I return to a set of articles by Bauman which reflected on 
the history of European Jewry. These encourage us to place Bauman in a historical and 
social context in which he is best identified as emerging from the racialized and classed 
politics of East European Jewry.  Bauman traces how this group were made the outsiders 
of the assimilatory project of West European Jewry then, as Jewish socialists, were victims 
of the political anti-Semitism of Communist regimes. Not only does this encourages us to 
be critical of the claims that he spoke from an elite ‘White European’ position, it also has 
further lessons for sociology which, in its own ‘war against forgetfulness’, has tended to 
impose simplistic racialized and political categories onto theorists. 
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This paper is a response to how Bauman is coming to be categorised and remembered in 
sociology, especially in his adopted home of Britain. I want to push back on an emerging claim 
that Bauman can be unproblematically placed in the category of the ‘white European’ theorist. 
This claim is often made not just to indicate his supposed position as part of an elite grouping 
but also to suggest this eliteness automatically imbibes his sociology.  In Bauman’s case this 
can be found in claims that his work contains an ‘imperialist gaze’ (Rattansi 2017a:65) as part 
of a more general ‘White, European’ gaze (Rattansi 2017b) which is ‘blind to issues 
of…racialisation’ (Rattansi 2017b:148) or reflects a Eurocentric view of the world which 
contains ‘sanctioned ignorance’ concerning other perspectives (Mayblin 2017).  This is then 
seen to hinder Bauman’s understanding of the world where his unwillingness to ‘name the 
metropole’ as a centre of power means he has ‘no coherent way of explaining’ the divide 
between the global rich and poor (Connell 2007:60) due to its ‘Western view’ of who counts 
as ‘we’ (Jay 2010:100).  Such claims reflect a broader critique concerning the 
representativeness of the sociological canon, whereby sociology is criticised for its reliance on 
‘Northern’ theory as ‘an ethno-sociology of metropolitan society’ (Connell 2007:226). In so 
doing, it is claimed sociology has historically practised a form of ‘segregation’ where some, 
white, theory is valourised and others dismissed (Bhambra 2014). The result of this is that 
sociology embodies ‘Eurocentrism’, which amounts to ‘a way of seeing and not-seeing’ in 
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which certain, white, voices are recognised and others ignored (Alatas and Sinha 2017:5).  This 
privileging of white, European writers who then reproduce colonial assumptions is said to be 
so pervasive that ‘much mainstream sociology can often appear to be whiteness studies in all 
but name’ (Bhatt 2016:399). Such claims are indicated in the suggestion that Bauman:  
remains trapped in a narrow Eurocentrism which considerably diminishes his capacity for 
understanding and explaining the contemporary world…there is a powerful sense in which, in 
Bauman’s thinking and voluminous writings, there is an unwitting collusion with imperial 
power (Rattansi 2017b:275) 
In pushing back against this claim I want to revisit a period of Bauman’s work often 
overlooked, his writings on European Jewry (though, as we shall see, the all-encompassing 
term ‘European’ is insufficient here).  The articles and book chapters which make up this period 
of Bauman’s work have, if the metrics are to be believed, been only infrequently read or cited.  
While of course Bauman is well known for writing Modernity and the Holocaust and his 
discussion of the stranger – the latter most notably found in the one book I include in this 
period, Modernity and Ambivalence – the writings I discuss below are exemplary pieces of 
historical sociology which, in reflecting upon the diverse positions of Jewish people across 
Western and Eastern Europe, also discuss how ‘Europe’ and the modernist drive within the 
continent, can be theorised.  In this sense, Bauman is part of a group who finds Jews ‘good to 
think with’ when theorising modernity (Goldberg 2017).  My claim will be that not only do 
these writings encourage us to rethink the scope of Bauman’s sociology, they also force us to 
reckon with what we do when we call a theorist ‘white’ or ascribe them to the categories of 
‘white’ or not, ‘European’ or not, exactly the separation resting behind many of the 
aforementioned claims concerning the problems of ‘Eurocentric, white’ sociology.   
Before I do this, it is appropriate to provide a note concerning the purpose of this discussion in 
relation to Bauman. There has already been significant debate about the extent to which 
Bauman’s biography impacted his sociology. As indicated above, many have seen Bauman’s 
position as a ‘white’, ‘European’, even ‘imperialist’ figure as shaping his sociology negatively. 
A more positive perspective came from Smith (1998:43) who commented on how Bauman had 
been ‘skilfully exploiting the privileged vantage point of the outsider’ in his discussion of 
modernity.  From the other side of this debate, Davis (2008:34) has been critical of the tendency 
of ‘reducing social theory to biography’ by seeking to claim Bauman’s sociology was a result 
of, contingent upon, or improved by his life circumstances. 
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My argument here is slightly different. Needless to say, as I will highlight below, some of the 
material discussed in this paper bares directly on Bauman’s biography; indeed, there is nothing 
he wrote which is more directly related to his life circumstances than the essay ‘Assimilation 
into Exile: The Jew as a Polish Writer’ (Bauman 1996). However, my purpose here is not to 
show how Bauman’s biography led him to the conclusions he draws in his writings, for better 
or worse.  Instead it is to show how the content of these writings encourages us to reflect on 
the biography of not just Bauman, but other Jewish social theorists who at best were able to 
claim only a ‘probationary whiteness’ (Jacobsen 1998:176).  As part of this, I will suggest that 
rather than being part of the ‘White, European’ gaze, Bauman can more accurately be aligned 
with the group of the ‘racialized outsiders’, who were subject to the internal racialisation 
processes within Europe (Virdee 2014).  In saying this, my goal is not to replace one racialised 
reading of Bauman – the ‘bad’ white and Eurocentric theorist – with another – the ‘good’ 
racialised outsider. Bauman’s position as a racialised outsider in and of itself makes his claims 
no more accurate than his being unproblematically ‘white’ would. Instead, such a 
categorisation makes us aware of the danger of reading theory via the imagined racialised 
position of the theorist; even if this is fruitful in a particular case, doing so requires a careful 
attention to historical context.  Following this, I also hope to suggest the example of European 
Jewry reminds us that uncritically using the phrase ‘Eurocentrism’ – with its tendency to take 
Western Europe as the meaning of ‘Europe’ – is, to use Deutscher’s (2017:61) words 
concerning the desire to understand Eastern Jews via Western assumptions, ‘to see with 
distorted vision and embark on an inquiry that will lead you nowhere’.   
The title of this paper, The War against Forgetfulness, comes from the title of one of the papers 
Bauman (1989a) published in this period. In the Conclusion, I will return to this piece and what 
its claim concerning ‘forgetfulness’ has to offer to sociology today. 
Assimilation and its Discontents 
A major theme of Bauman’s writings is the ‘assimilatory drive’ of Jewish people in Western 
Europe, with a special focus on Germany.  For Bauman, reflecting what Traverso (2013) 
termed ‘Jewish Modernity’, the promise of modernity became the way that Jews in Western 
Europe sought their liberation.  Modernity promised liberation due to its claims of universality 
since ‘universality is the warcry of the underprivileged. Modernity promised to strip everyone 
of their parochial clothing, liberating them by reducing them to pure human essence’ (Bauman 
1988a: 50).  This, of course, was very appealing to a group marked out historically by their 
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‘parochial clothing’ yet lacking the dressing room of the nation-state in which this clothing 
would be appropriate.  Therefore, West European Jews increasingly sought to invest 
themselves in the mission of modernist culture.  Consequently, for Traverso (2013) Jews 
increasingly, for better or worse, came to be identified as the ‘avant-garde’ of modernity.  As 
Bauman (1988a) notes, this was especially the case in Germany where Jewish intellectuals and 
cultural workers set themselves up as arbitrators of the extent to which the Enlightenment 
project had been realised, fulfilling the role of the philosophes of Enlightenment toleration 
(Grell and Porter 2000). Often this involved highlighting the extent to which ‘post-
Enlightenment society [was] living according to principles contrary to the declared ones’ 
(Bauman 1988a: 54).  Consequently, this project of assimilation took on a particular classed 
position, to quote Bauman, ‘whatever else it might have meant, assimilation was a middle-class 
project’ (Bauman 1988a: 64). 
This assimilatory project then produced its own responses, beyond Zionism.  One of these was 
the emergence of a distinctively Jewish Socialism.  Given the increasingly bourgeois position 
of those Western European middle class ‘assimilated’ Jews, for the working class ‘loyalty to 
traditional Jewish culture was a breeding and battleground of class struggle, and class 
resistance against Jewish capitalists involved a defence of Jewish language, beliefs and 
customs’ (Bauman 1996:576). This produced a rich history of distinctively Jewish forms of 
socialist thought.  As we shall see below, these forms of Jewish socialism also relied upon 
processes of racialisation; for now, it is enough to note how forms of socialism emerged in 
places such as Poland (Schatz 1991), Russia (Frankel 1981) and England (Fishman 2004) 
which took distinctive Jewish forms. This was true not just in the use of language, customs and 
organisation, but also in the sense that ideas and practices were shaped by the particular class 
positions and opportunities open to Jews in each context. In doing so, these socialist ideas also 
drew upon a history of Jewish messianism which was able to expand in the neo-romantic 
context of the early 20th Century (Löwy 2017). As Bauman put it Jewish socialists:  
saw in socialist society the fullest implementation of the same redemptive, Messianic drive of 
Judaism that has been swept under the carpet by the joint efforts of official orthodoxy and the 
rapidly ‘gentilizing’ capitalist elite. It was in the name of the Jewish redemptive tradition that 
power was to be wrenched from the doubly treacherous hands (in both class and national 
senses) of the Jewish bosses (Bauman 1988a:74-75)   
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Therefore, while opposed to the bourgeois assimilation project, by seeking to create a new 
society in which the liberation of Jews was achieved via the liberation of humanity, Jewish 
socialism became ‘a radical assimilation option’ (Riga 2012:58).   
Alternatively, the opposition to assimilation could produce the particular intellectual figure of 
what Deutscher (2017) once termed the ‘Non-Jewish Jew’, who sought to take the universalist 
nature of Judaic thinking beyond Judaism as a contribution to human emancipation.  For 
Bauman, one of his greatest inspirations, Freud, was the prime indicator of this tradition which, 
opposed to the assimilatory drive, went ‘against seeking universality by erasing one’s own 
identity and giving up what was unique in oneself. It proposed, instead, to raise one’s 
individuality to the level of universal value: to give, rather than give up’ (Bauman 1991:79). 
Nevertheless, for Bauman, the bourgeois assimilatory project became the dominant project of 
West European Jewry from the late 19th Century up to World War II.  Its failings however, 
quickly became clear.  Modernity, with its need for the figure of the ambivalent ‘stranger’ 
against whom to define its ordering mission, re-created the phenomenon of ‘allosemitism’: 
marking out Judaism as an object of difference (Bauman 1998).  As Bauman (1998) notes, 
while this object could be seen as the avant-garde, Jews could also be seen to be holding back 
modernity. This was the case in France where reactionary opinion associated Jews with the 
revolution while radical opinion saw them as the group standing in its way (Goldberg 2017:18-
24). It was the desire to dispense with such allosemitism that drove the assimilatory project.  
But, the fact allosemitism, a form of ambivalence, helped to shape modernity meant the project 
was doomed to fail: 
The very zeal with which the Jews tried to rid themselves of whatever the native elites declared 
to be the mark of an alien, was itself forged into the brand of Jewishness. With a twisted logic 
which to its victims looked more like a witch’s spell…When Heine and Börne excelled as 
journalists…journalism as such became a symbol of Jewishness – a Jewish invention for all, a 
Jewish retreat for some, a Jewish conspiracy for the most hostile among native opinion-makers 
(Bauman 1991:120) 
The assimilatory drive of middle-class Western European Jewry began to mark out its holders 
precisely because of its eager ‘assimilatory zeal’ (Bauman 1988a: 53).  As Bauman notes, 
modernity could absorb traditional Jewish communities living separately, according to 
orthodox customs, but it had more difficulty with the ‘boundary-blurring mobility’, the 
ambivalence, of the carriers of the assimilatory mission (Bauman 1988a: 54).  All attempts, 
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from whatever end of the political spectrum, to further the assimilatory mission ended up 
rebounding on those proclaiming them: 
The Jews became astute philosophers of the liberal creed, fiery preachers of socialist utopia and 
fearless warriors of communist revolution. Only to find out that the ambivalence they tried to 
escape had the awesome properties of quicksand: the faster they ran, the deeper they sank… 
The nationalists promptly announced the principled liberalism and unprincipled communism 
alike to be a Jewish plot to uproot the well-rooted (Bauman 1993a:30) 
Meanwhile, since the secularising urge of modernity had closed off conversion, with its 
assumption that allosemitism was based on sin, as a means of assimilation, modern notions of 
racism, and that ‘the nation is a commonality of fate and blood – or not a nation at all’ (Bauman 
1991:121) came increasingly to mark out antisemitism.  Jewishness increasingly came to be 
identified with a ‘look’ which no amount of assimilation could remove (Jacobsen 1998). 
It is at this point that Bauman reminds us of the importance of separating out Western and 
Eastern European Jewry. Reckoning with the failure of the assimilatory project to overcome 
allo-, and its resulting anti-, Semitism, those in the West invoked modernist logic in the creation 
of an ordered hierarchy of worth.  In order to show the value of the assimilatory project, that 
some Jewish people had assimilated: 
some Jews had to become ‘unworthy’ and all affinity and intercourse with them regarded as 
shameful and stigmatising. Really Jewish Jews were seen as saboteurs of what otherwise would 
surely have been a successful venture. They were blamed for the all-too evident, yet stubbornly 
denied, failure of assimilatory efforts (Bauman 1988a:60) 
These ‘Really Jewish Jews’ were identified as coming from the East, captured in the figure of 
the Ostjuden: 
In the folklore of assimilation, the Ostjuden were not allowed an identity of their own. Instead, 
their image was patched together out of the concerns and nightmares of the assimilating 
Western Jews. They served as a huge refuse bin of human characteristics into which all that 
nagged the conscience of the Western Jew and filled him with shame was dumped (Bauman 
1991:132) 
As Bauman details, it is easy to find catalogues of the refuse dumped into the figure of the 
Eastern Jew by those seeking assimilation in the West. This included: their uncleanliness, their 
tendency to steal, their lack of culture, their old-fashioned clothes, their superstitions, their 
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barbaric language, their lack of forward-thinking masculinity; in short, their lack of what made 
modernity civilised and worthwhile.  Much like the figures of colonial relationships, the 
Ostjuden was ‘the filthy, ignorant and immoral savage left over from pre-civilised times’ 
(Bauman 1989b:18-19).  A perfect example of this, as Bauman notes (1989b:18), came in 
England where the migration of Russian and Polish Jews into the East End of London was met 
with hostility not just by politicians (including those on the Left, see Virdee 2014:32-55) but 
by the middle class, assimilated Jews of established Anglo-Jewry (Fishman 2004).  Given the 
successes of assimilation in the 19th Century, notably via increased civil rights, these Ostjuden, 
with their uncivilised manners, superstitions and radical ideas, were a threat to this mission; 
they were seen as ‘substandard’ and a reminder of the ‘shameful past’ (Bauman 1996:575).  
This played out in the events of 1889 where, following labour organisation in the East End 
against the sweating industry and unemployment, the Chief Rabbi came out in favour of the 
sweating industry, questioned whether unemployment existed and blamed the dangerous ideas 
of imported ‘Eastern’ socialism for the disturbances (Fishman 2004:163-184). As we see here, 
those driving the assimilatory project were, by nature of their opposition to the Ostjuden, 
clearly imagining themselves carriers of the Enlightenment spirit. Consequently, in 1904 there 
was great relief when a way was found for English Jews to express their solidarity with their 
Eastern co-religionist suffering exploitation, but to also ensure they didn’t actually have to 
encounter them, when a company offered to transport them directly to America, with no 
stopover in London (Bauman 1989b:18).   
Meanwhile, in Germany, efforts were made to remove the embrassing mark of the Ostjuden. 
For example, social settlements were established, claiming to provide educational opportunities 
to new Jewish migrants from the East, but in reality to encourage a Western, middle class way 
of acting by removing all that was seen to mark out the Ostjuden.  This included the ‘jargon’ 
language of Yiddish, an overly Talmudic education and the efforts of Polish Rabbis who, it 
was claimed, taught their charges how to beg (Wertheimer 1987:143-161).  Tragically, as 
Bauman notes, resting behind this was the idea that it was only German modernity that offered 
emancipation to those assimilating Jews; their attempt to ‘re-educate’ their co-religionists, 
itself a fundamentally modernist solution, rested on the belief that ‘the truth of the German 
spirit would eventually out, whatever the tensions’ (Bauman 1990a:77). 
Therefore, in this period, what it meant to be Jewish in Europe was at the very least split 
between West and East1. Antisemitism was undoubtedly a common factor, but the way this 
was experienced, partly due to the role of West European Jewry in drawing upon racialized 
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tropes of the East, was different. It was also fundamentally a classed project, with the West 
increasingly developing a Jewish bourgeoisie, against the proletarian/peasant Jewish class of 
the East and its ready recruits to Jewish socialism. In so doing, East European Jews drew upon 
the ‘messianic-universalist’ tradition of Judaism which was stronger in Central and Eastern 
Europe than the West (Schatz 1991, Löwy 2017).  Meanwhile migration, especially as the result 
of the pogroms across the Romanov Empire, meant these two groups increasingly, though not 
wholly, had to live alongside each other, with Germany as the meeting point (Gay 1978, 
Wertheimer 1987).  This then produced different orientations, most notably in the difference 
in forms of emancipatory thought between West and East (Löwy 2017).  While in the West 
emancipation was seen to occur at an individual level, with Jewish faith being purely a private 
matter, in the East emancipation was seen to reside with a group marked out by their own 
distinct attributes (Traverso 2013).  It was their orientation away from the pretences of being 
part of any distinct group, their disgust with the Ostjuden, that allowed assimilating Western 
Jews to demonstrate their allegiance to modernity. As Bauman put it a ‘disgust lived as the sign 
of refinement’ is also ‘a disgust seen as the price of joining the good society’ (Bauman 
1989b:17). This was the world that the Polish Bauman was born into in 1925. 
The Holocaust and After in the East 
Of course, the major tragedy of the assimilatory project lay in what we now know came next: 
the Shoah. While Bauman suggests elements of the project would live on in some forms of 
Zionism (Bauman 1990a:78-79) this certainly bought an end to its advocacy in Western 
Europe.  Those who had survived from the West – primarily, as Bauman (1989b) notes, the 
previous advocates of the assimilatory project who could ‘pass’ as Aryan, or who had the 
money and connections to escape to safety – were able to redirect their class-based interests 
elsewhere. The same was not true in the East, particularly in the country Bauman experienced 
and discusses in most depth, Poland.   
Prior to World War II, Poland had a Jewish community of 3.4 million people, the second largest 
in the world at that point (Bauman 1969:5). In this period, 1/7th of all Jews globally lived in 
Poland and they accounted for 10% of the Polish population, with only Ukrainians (14%) as a 
bigger minority (Schatz 1991:24). While there had been some initial assimilatory efforts 
(Lichten 1986) by the early 20th Century Polish Jewry had a very particular class and social 
position.  To be exact, 78.6% of Jews worked in petty trade, primarily being self-employed in 
fields such as light industry, tailoring, shoemaking, carpentry and baking, primarily in urban 
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areas.  Given that Jews also made up 21.5% of Polish professionals, this initially suggests a 
broadly economically advantaged position, with rough numbers in 1931 of 100,000 
bourgeoisie; 2,000,000 petty bourgeoisie; working class 700,000; intelligentsia 300,000. 
However, these numbers betray what was an economically disadvantaged group. 50% of Jews 
lived in poverty and in some rural areas over 90% relied on welfare.  Their categorisation as 
‘petty bourgeois’ and self-employment as petty trade was a necessity driven by the policy of 
not hiring Jews in factories and the closures of many fields of employment to them. For 
example, Jews were only 1.8% of those employed in public service. Therefore, despite their 
objective classification, this was primarily a very economically deprived group, living in 
worsening conditions as Jewish industries closed and unemployment grew throughout the 20s 
and 30s (Schatz 1991:24-27).   
This inevitably produced a certain radicalism, with the Bund emerging as a radical replacement 
for traditional support structures (Guesnet 2001).  The appeal of such radical politics was 
furthered by the anti-Semitism of the Right and Centre and encouraged by the response of the 
traditional Left. While at certain crisis points the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) fought against 
anti-Semitism the overriding attitude was one of animosity, based initially upon the claim of 
the Bund’s ‘Russian’ origin and denial of Polish nationhood, followed by the attempts of the 
PPS to curry favour with the anti-Semitic Peasant’s Party in its attempt to appeal to ideas of 
Polish nationalism (Zimmerman 2001, Wróbel 2001).  This ensured that the Polish Communist 
Party (KPP) gained a significant following among Jews attracted by its internationalism, aided 
by the links between the Polish messianic tradition and Marxism.  Bauman partly emerged 
from this tradition, speaking of how communism offered a messianic vision of ‘a Poland free 
from poverty and hatred, from big and small humiliations inflicted by one man upon another’ 
(Bauman and Obirek 2015:110). Despite being illegal, the KPP counted a membership of 
roughly 40,000 in the mid-30s, of which Jews were no fewer than 22% of members and, in 
some areas, accounted for up to 60% (Schatz 1991:96). 
The war had a devastating impact on Polish Jewry, with only 250,000 people surviving 
(Bauman 1969:5).  Those who survived had a particular composition.  They had done so either 
– as in the case of Bauman’s future wife, Janina Levinson – by using what small bourgeoisie 
advantage they had been able to gain prior to the war and by a significant amount of luck or – 
like Zygmunt and his family – by fleeing to the Soviet Union, hardly itself a guarantee of 
salvation (Schatz 1991:150-151).  Each case however shared a common perspective. While 
gentile Poles ‘saw little difference between the two enemies [Nazis and the Soviets]. For the 
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Jews, the difference was one between life and death. Horrified, the Poles watched the 
enthusiasm with which most Jews greeted the Red Army’ (Bauman 1996:584).  Due to this, 
and their nation’s strong history of Jewish socialism, Polish Jews who had survived the 
Holocaust found themselves disproportionally represented in the administrative functions of 
the emerging Communist state and its intellectual class. Bauman, of course, was in both groups 
at different points2.   
This then had two impacts for Polish Jewry.  Firstly, Jewish people came to be identified as the 
betrayers of the Polish cause.  As Bauman put it: 
modern Polish nationalism, with its programme of cultural homogeneity and its struggle for a 
Polish state which was to become a state of the Poles…offered an escape and a shelter against 
that threatening ambivalence of which the Jews had now become the prime examples. Note that 
Russians or Germans, by far the more threatening enemy by any standard came second to the 
Jews as a negative support of the budding Polish national identity. They were enemies all right 
– but too unambiguously hostile for the purpose. Only the Jews were truly fit to exemplify in a 
clearly visible form ‘the other’ of the national identity, that chaos against which national unity 
promised to defend (Bauman 1996:582) 
This can be seen in the continuation of post-war violence.  Between the end of the war and the 
summer of 1947 approximately 1,500 Jews were killed in assaults that took place in 155 
localities across Poland (Schatz 1991:207).  Consequently, while Communism had, in theory, 
raised anti-racism to state policy, the over-representation of Jewish people within the state 
hierarchy and the emerging opposition to Israel on the basis of an ‘anti-Zionist’ position meant 
that: 
The few who survived easily recognised in postwar Poland the all-too-familiar atmosphere of 
surveillance and vigilant censorship. Now, to be sure, they were not charged with the crime of 
Jewishness. The accusation was rephrased and reworded to suit the changing circumstances. 
Sometimes they were resented simply as the carriers of an unspecified ‘alien spirit’. At other 
times as ‘cosmopolitans’. Or ‘Zionists’. Or ‘Communists’. Or ‘Russian helpers’ (Bauman 
1996:589) 
This backdrop of the re-articulation of anti-Semitism as linked to the anti-Polish and/or anti-
Communist ‘spirit’ of the Jewish people is then of course central to the anti-Semitic purge of 
19683.  What distinguished the 1968 purge for Bauman was its status as a ‘purely political 
phenomenon, in which the Jews are playing the part of a scapegoat to attract the whole 
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accumulated aggressiveness and frustration of the embittered and disillusioned mass’ (Bauman 
1969:4).  The Communist state dealt with the crisis tendencies found in what Bauman terms 
‘second-generation socialism’ (Bauman 1972) by evoking the enemy of ‘international Judaism’ 
and thereby forcing a significant number of those who had survived the Holocaust into exile.  
Furthermore, as Bauman (1971) notes, anti-Semitism was not simply a governmental policy. 
The Party had to deal with the political frustrations towards communism, while ensuring its 
continued hegemony. Meanwhile, the opposition also had to rally support while not being 
openly anti-Soviet. In each case, since one cannot speak of anti-Sovietism, anti-Semitism was 
encouraged (Schatz 1991:282-312).  The result of this, and other, purges was to open up new 
state position and resources for gentile Poles, while assuring Polish nationalism was placated 
by treating the Jews as ‘the essentially alien, exotic curosity’ (Bauman 1988c:26) standing in 
the way of Polish nationhood.   
Of course, Bauman was one of the most prominent victims of this, with his name announced 
on TV by the President as an enemy of the nation.  Those Jewish people left in Poland – mostly 
the old without qualifications (therefore not competitors for state administrative positions) and 
the young – were suddenly forced to see themselves as ‘Jewish’, rather than the Poles they had, 
with the initial encouragement of the Communist state, come to think of themselves as 
(Bauman 1969).  Their small number however produced a distinctively Polish anti-Semitism 
‘in the absence of Jews’ (Bauman 1996:585). This continued with the emergence of Solidarity 
where the Party once more tried to stoke anti-Semitism as a cause in its own defence 
(Hirszowicz 1986) and continues today in the policies of the governing Law and Justice party.  
Meanwhile, the Polish Jewish Communists, like Bauman, forced into exile had to reckon with 
suddenly being reminded of their Jewishness – of suddenly being ‘persons-to-count’ (Bauman 
1997:158) – having sought in Communism the possibility of a world which transcended this 
(Schatz 1991)4. 
The Legacy of this Period and Bauman’s Place within It 
I now want to turn to two legacies from this period outlined in Bauman’s work which are 
important for sociology today.  The first is the continuing relation between West and East 
European Jewry.  As Bauman notes, when East European Jewry is remembered – and this is a 
conflicted legacy in countries such as Poland unwilling to face up to historical guilt (Bauman 
1988c: 28) – it continues to be framed by its negation to the bourgeois West European Jewish 
figures of modernity many, such as sociologists, tend to celebrate: 
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In Western Europe, but above all in America, the fading memory of eastern Jewish history 
serves as a benchmark against which one’s own progress is measured: ‘look – that was the 
bottom from which we have pulled ourselves’. The deeper the bottom, the more towering seem 
the present heights. The last service the lost tribes are called to render is to offer their history 
as the backcloth of misery on which the riches and the honours of the western descendants may 
shine in all their splendour… Those millions of Jews who still populate East Europe have been 
so far acknowledged by western Jewish opinion solely as the people clamouring to escape; 
relevant concerns and duties of solidarity are by and large reduced to the slogan ‘let my people 
go’ (Bauman 1989b: 15, 23) 
I would suggest this manifests itself in sociology not via a distinction between East and Western 
Europe, but by denying any distinction.  Instead, the tendency is to speak of ‘Europe’, and its 
production of social theorists, Bauman hardly being alone in his Jewishness, as if there were 
one European position. The very phrase ‘Eurocentric’ implies this unity of voice.  As Bauman 
encourages us to remember however, at least for European Jewry, this is simply not possible 
to sustain.  During modernity it was split into two, with an imagined hierarchy intersected with 
a class and racialized politics.  It is of course the case that each side of this divide had their 
own experience of anti-Semitism but we should maintain an awareness of how East European 
Jewry had their own class and racialized experiences.  Given this, it is perhaps unsurprisingly 
that some of Bauman’s earliest pieces after his exile and arrival in England begin, much as 
postcolonial scholars would today, with a critique of ‘Western’ scholars for trying to impose 
their own categories on ‘the East’, as in the case of seeking to show ‘how close’ the East must 
be to the Western norm (Bauman 1972:217-218). 
The second point brings me to Bauman himself.  As I have indicated at various points 
throughout, the story Bauman traces of European Jewry, its split between East and West, its 
class and racialized politics and its eventual fate in Poland is, at the same time, the story of 
Bauman’s life up to, and I would suggest beyond, his exile5.  Bauman notes that those in his 
position had similar experiences: 
Treated as aliens by the Polish public, Polish-Jewish writers found their retreat and shelter in 
the Polish language. Here, they felt at home. As the home stood in the midst of a social desert, 
they lavished on it all their otherwise unspent emotions. The language benefitted, though its 
benefactors did not. Most of the latter perished as Jews, and were only posthumously upgraded 




Such writers, exiled and excluded from their home, ‘burdened the Word with all their 
unfulfilled hopes, promises received but not kept, and first and foremost with their dreams of 
a world of moral purity’ (Bauman 1996:596), a description which, if it fits anyone, fits the 
poetic sociology of the Levinas-inspired Zygmunt Bauman. Late in life he commented on how, 
as a Jew, he ‘had to win my Polish identity and “prove” my right to it – albeit I realised quite 
soon that this calvary was never to end and would need to be continued till my death, and 
probably beyond’ (Bauman and Obirek 2015:108). Alas, so it remains in the anti-Semitic and 
anti ‘Communist’ Poland of today where Bauman is a useful figure of condemnation precisely 
because he was forced into exile and therefore was seen to have abdicated his Polishness 
(Bucholc 2016:60). 
To assign such a figure unproblematically to a dominant racial social group is both a 
fundamentally ahistorical claim that overlooks the particular position from which Bauman 
came and implies that some forms of racism are more significant than others. Indeed, it is 
difficult to imagine a social theorist who had written as much as Bauman did on the racialisation 
of Jewish people in Europe about any other racialized grouping being criticised similarly.  For 
example, in his criticism of Bauman’s ‘narrow Eurocentrism’ and ‘white’ perspective Rattansi 
(2017b) engages in no discussion, and demonstrates no awareness, of the writings I have 
discussed in this piece; bar a short discussion of Modernity and Ambivalence, which is framed 
as ‘an extended footnote to Modernity and the Holocaust’ (Rattansi 2017b:88). He then goes 
on to claim that ‘in keeping with [Bauman’s] continuing Eurocentrism; the only minority he 
evinces any sustained interest is the Jewish diaspora’ (Rattansi 2017b:98).  Not only is it 
difficult to see how an interest in the Jewish diaspora makes one ‘Eurocentric’, the implication 
here seems to be that Bauman is not being a ‘true’ scholar of race by focusing on Jews and 
anti-Semitism. This is not to deny, as Rattansi (2017a) argues, that certain elements of 
Bauman’s work may marginalise the significance of race but it is to say that it does not make 
a thinker ‘blind’ to race, or suggest a ‘neglect’ of race, as Rattansi (2017b:210) claims. 
Instead, rather than including Bauman within problematically simplistic dualisms, following 
an early suggestion from Smith (1998) of Bauman’s status of an ‘outsider’ I would go one 
further and suggest, following Virdee’s usage, that Bauman belongs to the group of the 
‘racialized outsider’, who are defined against the ‘dominant conception’ of a national formation 
and often marked by their ‘participation in subaltern conflicts’ (Virdee 2014:164).  It is to this 
grouping that Bauman belongs. This does not mean his work is without flaw, or that we should 
simply accept Bauman’s claims because of his biography or his positioning. But, it does mean 
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any critique on what he has to say should not fall back on the trope of his ‘whiteness’ or 
‘Eurocentrism’.   
The War against Forgetfulness and Sociology 
As mentioned in my introduction, I take the title of this paper from a piece published by 
Bauman in 1989.  Unlike anything else in his oeuvre, this is a short photo-essay published, like 
many papers of this period, in Jewish Quarterly and inspired by a book entitled Time of Stones 
by a Polish photographer, Monika Krajewski.  Over a period of ten years, starting in the late 
70s, Karejewski photographed Jewish cemeteries across Poland, in their various states of 
disrepair.  Discussing the photos, some of which are reproduced in the text, Bauman reflects 
on how they indicate a ‘popular movement…aimed at the rescuing of Jewish history and 
culture from oblivion’ a history ‘waiting to be dug out and repossessed by its rightful 
descendants’ (Bauman 1989a:47). This was the ‘war against forgetfulness’ being played out in 
Poland, a war that had a deadline beyond which things would be forgotten, as the stones of the 
graveyards increasingly turned to dust. 
I would suggest sociology has its own war against forgetfulness when it comes to how we 
categorise and remember writers. We should be constantly on guard against a tendency we are 
becoming increasingly guilty of, imposing racialized categorisations onto individuals and 
groups without an awareness of their historical, social and political positioning.  As argued 
above, writers on Bauman have been too ready to assign him to a category of ‘whiteness’ which 
it is difficult to see he was ever truly granted6. This reaches its apotheosis in Rattansi’s critique 
where he accuses Bauman of being ‘imprisoned’ in his ‘white’ ethnicity, which was probably 
a surprise to someone forced to flee into exile precisely because he wasn’t seen as ‘white’ 
(Rattansi 2017b:14).  Bauman is hardly alone in suffering this fate, for example, Connell’s 
critique of ‘Northern Theory’ assigns a whole group of Jewish writers, subject to ‘probationary 
whiteness’, including Bauman, Durkheim7, Levi-Strauss, Marx, Negri and Simmel to this 
category without considering whether their being Jewish may have impacted their position 
(Connell 2007:1-68).  Such claims ‘neglect the role of Jews in Europe and America as an 
internal other’ (Goldberg 2017:5).  It also lessens sociology, removing a key component of its 
project: the recognition of contingent and historically transforming processes of social 
positioning, racialisation and political formation. 
A similar problem can be found in the claims from Rattansi (2017b: 96) that Bauman cannot 
fully appreciate the causes of anti-Semitism since he doesn’t recognise how the ‘Oriental’ 
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position of the Jew placed them in the position of the colonial subject against the imperial West. 
While in some cases this was true it is only part of what Bauman (1991:181) termed the 
‘contradictory assimilatory pressures’, namely that ‘the ambiguous image of the 
Jew…sometimes resembled but at other times differed from representations of colonial 
subjects’ (Goldberg 2017:6). In Bauman’s (1998:150) terms, the ambivalence of the Jew was 
in their role as pariah and parvenu. Therefore, seeking to collapse this relationship into one 
simply of imperial master and colonial subject (see, for example, Mayblin et al. 2016:72), 
hinders more than it aids our understanding.  A significant contribution of the postcolonial 
project has been its call to recognise the importance of finely grained historically shaped forms 
of power and racialisation which continue into the current day. We leave ourselves poorer if 
we respond to this call by, when discussing social theorists, overlooking the particular forms 
of internal racialisation and class politics which shaped anti-Semitism across Europe (Virdee 
2019). 
Winning the war against forgetfulness in contemporary sociology requires the kind of rich 
historical sociology Bauman – ironically perhaps later a theorist seen to embody the 
problematic ‘presentism’ of contemporary British sociology (Inglis 2014) – produced in this 
period. But, it also requires more of us as critical readers of social theory. Substantive 
engagement with the work and claims of social theory should always take prominence over 
simplistic claims of the theorist’s elite social position. 
Notes 
1. It could be argued this split between Western and Eastern Europe is itself too simplistic since 
it overlooks the special circumstances of Jewish Central Europe. Discussed most notably by 
Löwy (2017), this produced a unique intelligentsia who, with the German focus on kultur 
against zivilization, emphasised a romantic and messianic libertarian critique not found in the 
East and West. While Bauman does at point acknowledge the particular position of Central 
European Jews (for example, Bauman 1991:109) they are usually defined in opposition to the 
dominant West/East split. There are, I would suggest, two reasons why Bauman relies on a 
dichotomous split. Firstly, as we shall see in the next section, his analysis is also shaped by the 
division between Communist and Capitalist Europe, a split which he argues has then shaped 
how European Jews are remembered. Secondly, his focus on the proletarian nature of Jewish 
socialism makes his class focus slightly different from the intellectuals who make up Löwy’s 
study; though he shares some similar thoughts on Walter Benjamin (cf. Bauman 1993b). In this 
sense, Bauman is closer to an approach which defines the proletarian/peasant Jews of Central 
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and Eastern Europe as part of a common ‘Yiddishland’ marked by similar practices and social 
positions (Brossat and Klingberg 2016).  Germany then is conceived of as as the meeting 
grounds for these groups in Bauman’s work (Bauman 1989b). For the purpose of our 
discussion, Löwy is a useful remind of my central argument: that it is difficult to speak of an 
undifferentiated Europe which could birth a ‘Eurocentric’ position. 
2. While the especially strong ideological appeal of communism to Polish Jews should not be 
underplayed (see Schatz 1991), we should never forget how appealing communism was to a 
whole generation just coming to terms with the horrors of the Holocaust; the USSR could be 
seen as the source of their salvation.  As Bauman puts it, many in this period were driven simply 
by the idea of a ‘normal life, whatever “normal” might mean’ (Bauman and Obirek 2015:148). 
3. Bauman suggested similar processes of rearticulating anti-Semitism were central to the 
emergence of a ‘New’ Right during the period of perestroika in Russia (Bauman 1988b) 
4. Throughout this section I have frequently cited Schatz’s (1991) magnificent text on the 
generation of Polish Jewish Communists born around 1910 and therefore older contemporaries 
of Bauman. It is perhaps worth noting in this context that Bauman reviewed this book and spoke 
of it in very positive terms as ‘a praiseworthy example of sociology in action’ and as a 
‘laboratory’ for his own sociological hermeneutics method given its ‘textbook pattern of the 
intimate weaving of biography and history’ (Bauman 1990b:175). See both Cheyette and Davis 
in this special issue of Thesis Eleven for more on these themes. 
5. By settling in Leeds, Bauman continued a historical trend in a city whose Jewish community 
had expanded greatly by the emigration of Polish Jews a couple of generations earlier.  Though 
this earlier generation had less engagement in socialist, and more in Zionist, politics (Krausz 
1964:31). 
6. One possible response to my argument is that even if we accept Bauman’s ‘probationary 
whiteness’ in the context of Poland, once he came to Britain he effectively ‘became white’ due 
to his elite position and since racism in Britain during this period became increasingly based on 
colour. However, this argument is not especially convincing. Not only does it seem to suggest 
Britain is free of anti-Semitism, but it also doesn’t match Bauman’s experiences. As his wife 
Janina made clear, living in Britain also meant ‘living with antisemitism’ (J. Bauman 2007). 
Indeed, Zygmunt spoke of how in Britain he was ‘an immigrant, a newcomer, an alien’ where, 
even after gaining citizenship ‘neither my students nor my colleagues ever had any doubt I was 
a foreigner’ (Bauman 2004:9).  This is not to claim the extent and ferocity of anti-Semitism in 
Britain from the 70s onwards was equal to that of Poland, such a claim is obviously untrue. It 
is to claim that being ‘probationary’ whiteness there is always the possibility, well known to its 
subject, of it being taken away or not fully recognised.  As Bauman (1997) notes, while some 
lucky new arrivals to a country get to be called ‘exiles’, most are simply ‘foreigners’ or 
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‘immigrants’ and, at points, both are likely to experience the xenophobia which comes with this 
position.  
7. Durkheim is a particularly egregious case here. To take just one example of how Durkheim was 
denied ‘whiteness’: during World War I, despite having published two substantial pieces of 
anti-German propaganda and with his son serving and dying on the frontline, Durkheim was 
openly accused in the French senate of being a German agent and attacked in the press as a 
‘Boche with a pasteboard nose’ (Lepenies 1992:78).  As Goldberg (2017) suggests, the context 
of France at the time would not allow Durkheim to be anything but Jewish, as Durkheim 
indicated in his own discussion of anti-Semitism (Durkheim 2008:322).   
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